Introduction
The September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent military response by the administration of George W. Bush had significant consequences for the work of US-based non-governmental organizations working on human rights-related issues around the world. NGOs active in the fields of humanitarian aid, development, and human rights faced challenges ranging from increased security threats to their staff, more governmental restrictions and violations of civil and political rights, and pressures to align themselves with foreign policy objectives of the United States. While the global environment for their operations deteriorated as a consequence of the terrorist attacks and violent state responses, transnational NGOs proved resilient and became a key defense for the international human rights regime. Transnational activists led by organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch succeeded in halting a rapidly deteriorating respect for human rights in the United States and elsewhere. In the development and humanitarian sector, human rights ideas continued to flourish and gave rise to significant organizational and strategic innovations strengthening advocacy strategies in defense of explicit rights claims. The strength of the global human rights regime was tested by 9/11, but its power remains largely intact and its reach continues to expand.
While 9/11 and the subsequent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had important and often negative consequences for NGOs, the events were not a major turning point for NGOs or the international human rights regime. Continuity and change of transnational human rights activism is best understood not in the context of 9/11, but in the context of how the a specific model of non-governmental mobilizing against human rights violations emerged during the 1960s and 1970s and experienced a profound crisis during the early 1990s, when this model of 'shaming' primarily state perpetrators for violations became increasingly outdated. Well before 9/11, NGOs across different sectors of transnational activism had begun to develop more proactive and preventative strategies whose aims were to overcome the inherent limitations of a reactive activist model. Despite facing different kinds of challenges in the post-9/11 world, many development, human rights, and humanitarian groups were joined in a focus on improving the legitimacy and accountability of Northern-based advocacy, a desire to move beyond defending a narrow set of civil and political rights, and a need to adopt new networking and mobilization strategies as a basis for recruiting supporters and organizing campaigns.
States responding to terrorism with violence and restrictions on civil rights and political freedoms made it more difficult for NGOs to expand advocacy efforts and temporarily forced them to spend resources on preventing further backsliding on basic civil rights in established democracies. As it turned out, NGOs were successful in defending basic human rights protections under threat in many democratic societies, while also continuing to innovate with regard to pushing into areas of social and economic justice. A well-established global human rights treaty system certainly aided NGOs in their efforts and has provided additional support in favor of increasing respect for these norms (Simmons 2009 ).
This chapter begins with a brief history of the transnational human rights movement, primarily focused on US and European-based activist groups. This section will highlight how the creation of human rights institutions at the global and regional levels facilitated a peculiar type of transnational activism represented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch which was focused on ex post 'shaming' and mass media strategies targeted at governments. The 1970s represent the key period when human rights became the central frame of global activism, such as the struggles against colonialism and Apartheid or the movements challenging authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America. But it also represented a period where human rights advocacy became largely separated from development and humanitarian efforts.
The next section will then describe in what ways the end of the Cold War exposed some of the limitations of transnational activism (Rodio and Schmitz 2010) . Questions about the effectiveness and accountability of NGOs multiplied following the atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the subsequent humanitarian crises in the Great Lakes region, and the perceived failures of the development aid model. The experiences of the 1990s crystallized for many NGOs ongoing discussions about how intensified advocacy efforts, increased focus on prevention, and intensified collaboration across sectors may strengthen the transnational NGO sector as a whole.
The third main section then elaborates why 9/11was not a major turning point for transnational NGOs in the United States. Based on extensive interviews with leaders of selected US-based transnational NGOs, conducted between 2005 and 2008, the section shows that fundamental challenges to the transnational activist model emerged well before 9/11 and became particularly apparent in the post-Cold War period. To be sure, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the global focus on terrorism and sectarian violence had significant repercussions for transnational NGOs. But 9/11 did neither result in a significant erosion of support for the global human rights regime, nor did it slow down the previously set in motion intensified cross-sectoral collaborations between human rights, humanitarian, environmental, and development organizations.
In a post-9/11 world, human rights NGOs mobilized effectively against efforts to limit basic civil and political rights, while activists in other sectors implemented lessons learned during the 1990s and earlier. For humanitarian organizations, the Rwandan genocide and other humanitarian crises of the 1990s led to a fundamental questioning of the norms of impartiality and independence (Anderson 1999 ). An increased focus on the consequences and effectiveness of humanitarian aid as well as greater accountability to those receiving aid became central to reform efforts expressed in the adoption of codes of conduct. After 9/11, when aid groups faced efforts by the US military to take over humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and Iraq, individual organizations already had experience in dealing with the inevitable politicization of the humanitarian model (de Torrente 2004; O'Brien 2004) . In the development sector, a profound sense of crisis also preceded 9/11 and focused primarily on the failures of development aid and the 'charity' model. During the 1990s, development NGOs increasingly looked towards human rights ideas as a key to regaining legitimacy. A rights-based approach (RBA) to development (Uvin 2004 ) emerged as NGOs explored more sustainable ways of supporting economic development. Finally, human rights groups began well before 9/11 to question the success of ex-post 'shaming' strategies and develop more sustainable efforts to prevent abuses. Post-9/11, the already established focus on violence committed by non-state armed groups aligned with new concerns about terrorism and sectarian violence.
Initiated in the 1990s, the significant strategic shifts within sectors of transnational activism were accompanied by increased collaboration among transnational activist groups. The rights-based development agenda, the broad support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), the landmines ban, and the INGO Accountability Charter of 2006 represent a few examples of joint efforts to increase the effectiveness and accountability of transnational activist groups. The events following 9/11 offered nothing more than a reminder about the inadequacies of a reactive and ameliorative activist model which had been in crisis for some time and had failed to effectively address fundamental injustices causing poverty, ethnic divisions, and discrimination. Understanding the successes (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and challenges (Rieff 1999; Tarrow 2005) of this new type of transnational activism represents the crucial backdrop to assessing continuity and change after 9/11.
The first section here focuses on how the Cold War shaped the organization and strategies of transnational human rights activism. Three prominent effects stand out: The narrowed focus on civil and political rights, the focus on "information politics" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 18) 
The Evolution of Modern Transnational Human Rights Activism
The adoption of an expanding list of global and regional human rights accords undergirds the emergence and legitimization of transnational human rights activism. During the 1960s and 70s, human rights groups established their moral authority based on strategies of 'bearing witness'
and 'shaming' the perpetrators through meticulous research and publication of violations (Hopgood 2006: 14 The emergence of HRW and its success in challenging AI created a more competitive environment among human rights groups and led to some innovation, but it did not prevent the profound crisis of the movement during the 1990s. This crisis was largely the result of a failure to take seriously the human rights issues of the Global South as well as a blindly principled view 1 that was ill-prepared for developing more sophisticated analyses of the social and political root causes of many human rights violations. The professionalization of human rights activism also created growing complacency on the part of (liberal) states and the general public. As the visibility and mass media efforts of human rights groups increased, the general public became content with delegating these tasks to an elite group of activists. For humanitarian aid groups, the core value of neutrality and non-discrimination (Leebaw 2007: 227) was fundamentally challenged during their operations in refugee camps following the Rwandan genocide in 1994. As some Hutus 'genocidaires' used the aid to reorganize in the camps and sustain the violence, humanitarian groups faced accusations that their aid "strengthened the power of the very people who had caused the tragedy" (Terry 2002: 2) .
Beyond the cases of possibly doing harm by enabling continued violence, humanitarian aid frequently violated the dignity of those receiving aid as increased professionalization and technical capabilities to deliver aid were not matched by adequate concerns for the basic rights of those affected by natural or human-made disasters. As humanitarian groups faced increasing criticisms, fundamental norms of neutrality, impartiality, and independence were weighted against the possible negative consequences of short-term aid (Barnett and Weiss 2008 The dignity of those receiving aid has also become a greater concern in the area of more longterm development aid. Here, the main cause pushing the shift away from neutrality and charity was precipitated by a widespread perception of failure of development aid overall. Human rights ideas became central to closing the gap between organizations working in traditional development areas of education or health care and advocacy NGOs primarily focused on 'shaming' strategies. Many of the major development NGOs, including CARE, Oxfam, and ActionAid, adopted some version of a rights-based approach to development and supplemented their service activities with expanded advocacy efforts. A similar, if slower movement in the opposite direction emerged among traditional human rights groups. As aid groups moved into advocacy, organizations such as AI experimented with campaigns on social and economic rights and began to develop tentative ideas about how to broaden their legitimacy and take seriously the challenge of how a "more acutely political, as opposed to moral activism might be more attentive to the question of whom activists represent" (Ignatieff 2002: 10) .
Addressing Root Causes of Human Rights Violations
Based on growing awareness of the limits of apolitical, professionalized activism across the humanitarian, development, and human rights sectors, transnational NGOs also began in the 1990s to devote more resources to understanding better the causes of poverty, systematic abuses, and their own frequent failures to contribute to a sustainable improvement of the conditions motivating their interventions in the first place. factories. By shifting the target of mobilization away from states, human rights groups not only abandoned the fiction of state sovereignty over a given territory and population, but also moved into new issue areas, including conflict resolution, social and economic rights, and economic development.
Strengthening International Institutions
The participation of advocacy networks in the creation and evolution of global human rights institutions has become a major focus of scholarly research (Martens 2005) . During the 1970s, a coalition of states across ideological divides tried (and failed) to revoke the consultative status of many human rights organizations and inadvertently confirmed the rising power of nongovernmental participation (Shestack 1978: 91) . 
After 9/11: Interviews with US -based human rights groups
The events following the attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a profound effect on transnational non-governmental organizations, but those effects are best understood in the context of changes taking place during the 1990s. This history can be written as a smashing success measured in organizational growth as well as increased influence and power, but it also reveals episodes of profound crisis of the professionalized model across all sectors of activism.
Success and crisis created during the 1990s conditions facilitating fundamental organizational reforms and strategic re-orientation within many organizations, but also across the main sectors of humanitarian relief, human rights, development, and environmental protection. These reforms helped the global NGO community, and in particular US-based groups, to respond in a more concerted fashion to the events following the attacks of 9/11 and specifically the policies of the Bush Administration. This section presents evidence from 12 interviews with the leadership of selected US-based human rights conducted between 2005 and 2008. While the semi-structured interviews covered issues of governance, effectiveness, accountability, networking, and leadership, the primary focus here is on evidence speaking to the NGOs' responses to the events of and subsequent to 9/11.
The broader study 3 included interviews with 152 leaders of transnational NGOs based in the United States (Hermann et al. 2010) . A basic population of transnational NGOs was determined based on organizations rated for financial health by Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.com). The sample for the study was then determined based on criteria of size, financial efficiency, and main area of activity, including organizations active in conflict resolution (13 organizations), human rights (21), humanitarian relief (32), environmental activism (22), and sustainable development (64). The interviewers typically travelled to the headquarters of the organization and the interviews took between 90 and 120 minutes.
Confidentiality was promised to all organizations included in this study.
9/11 and the subsequent military response by the Bush Administration had significant repercussions for US-based and international NGOs. Organizations relying on funding from the United States Agency of International Aid (USAID) faced increased pressures to align themselves with US foreign policy goals (Sunga 2007: 107) and to refrain from any advocacy critical of US policies. Naomi Klein summarized the Bush Administration's views in 2003, writing: "NGOs should be nothing more than the good hearted charity wing of the military, silently mopping up after wars and famines. Their job is not to ask how these tragedies could have been averted or to advocate for policy solutions " (Klein 2003) . Following the 9/11 attacks, counter-terrorism laws were broadened in many developed nations, affecting overseas funding for development and civil society support (Sidel 2008) . While this 'disciplining' of civil society (Howell et al. 2008: 92) across the world should not be underestimated, the interviews with TNGO leaders show little evidence that 9/11 was a major watershed for transnational activism.
The interviews reveal that NGOs active in the development, humanitarian, and human rights sectors consistently focused on how to address shortcomings in their own effectiveness and accountability. While there is evidence that issues of terrorism-related state repression as well as specific US policies (e.g., renditions, Guantanamo) garnered greater attention relative to other advocacy topics, NGOs have not changed their missions as a result of any material pressure that may have been applied. Shifts in funding opportunities implemented by the newly incoming administration prior to 9/11 as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq shaped the focus of USbased NGOs, especially for humanitarian and development organizations with substantial US government contracts. 4 But many of these organizations also took this opportunity as a challenge to diversify funding sources and ease their dependency on USAID or other governmental donors. For the service delivery sector, the interviews with humanitarian organizations offer additional evidence about how current thinking about strategic and organizational change is primarily driven by experiences dating back to the 1990s. While 9/11 and its consequences, in particular the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, had a major impact on humanitarian groups, the concomitant challenges to the traditional humanitarian model of impartiality had emerged well before 2001 and most prominently during the 1990s. Following the Rwandan genocide, humanitarian organizations had already developed codes of conduct and addressed some of the political consequences of their interventions. The US policies after 9/11, and particularly the challenge of operating alongside belligerents, reignited a debate between those activists advocating for a return to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and others claiming that such an option no longer existed and would do more harm than good.
A representative of one humanitarian organization interviewed for our study pointed out that in a post 9/11 world "independent, neutral, impartial organizations…are being marginalized" and governments are now looking for organizations to "help them implement their political goals." Finally, in the sustainable development sector, the interviews confirm an ongoing shift away from the traditional donor model of transferring resources from rich to poor nations. An increasing number of development organizations are using a rights-based understanding of poverty to justify their increased efforts in advocacy and a relative decline of providing direct aid which may only create and sustain dependencies. These trends emerged well before 9/11 and show strong similarities to debates with the humanitarian and human rights sectors. As is the case elsewhere, there are development organizations which have moved much more quickly in embracing a rights-based approach as well as more extensive advocacy strategies, while others express skepticism about such changes and fear that donors or members will punish such profound changes in mandate and strategy. Just as AI struggled with abandoning its letter-writing model and shifting towards broader campaigns, child sponsorship organizations in the US and elsewhere face a tension between developing broader strategies empowering local communities and maintaining the traditional focus on transferring funds to a child and family in need. In both cases, the singular link between an individual or a group of sponsors in the North and someone in need in the Global South proved to be a successful business model, but its limitations became increasingly visible in the 1990s.
One interviewee of a development organization explained that "what we really struggle with is how can you incorporate structural change deep into an organizational business model that has historically been founded on a philanthropic basis.
[…] If, and so we wanted to get, we wanted to depart from the charitable model, and move toward a structural model. The second thing we decided we wanted to do is we wanted to anchor all of that work and structural social change in a rights based approach." 7 This profound shift currently taking place in the development sector creates unique challenges and tensions. While barriers between different sectors of transnational activism are disappearing, individual organizations struggle with developing the appropriate 7 All quotes in this section are from interview 3 with a representative of a development organization.
organizational structures and capabilities to accomplish much more complex tasks and mandates.
Across all three sectors discussed here, acknowledging the fact that neutral and impartial activism has always been a fiction creates extensive challenges not only in maintaining donor support but also for recruitment and training of staff. The interviews show across all sectors that NGO leaders see organizational learning and increasing their own impact as the key challenge.
Conclusions
The 9 A key paradox emerging from this analysis is the simultaneous strengthening of the global human rights discourse occurring alongside the profound crisis and weakness of transnational activism overall. During the past decades, humanitarian, human rights, and development NGOs have perfected addressing symptoms rather than root causes. Violations are reported and aid is handed down to victims of disasters and poverty, but only rarely are the root causes of these conditions addressed. While many organizations across these three sectors began in the 1990s to explore what a more pro-active, preventive (and effective) strategy would look like, 9/11 highlighted the limitations of the reactive model and increased the urgency to create more effective strategies and coalitions with the ability to address structural conditions of discrimination, poverty, and exclusion. In this context, the US-led military response represented a more challenging global environment since many NGOs were at the same time experimenting
with new and more overtly political strategies while also facing increased pressures from governments using security arguments as an excuse for increased repression. While the majority of transnational NGOs interviewed for this study were capable of mitigating such pressures, smaller and local NGOs were more likely to respond by avoiding controversial issues.
Human rights groups based in the United States (or elsewhere) were largely unable to prevent or end any of the policies implemented by the Bush Administration in response to the terrorist attacks. Governmental secrecy combined with a lack of public attention and support severely undercut the effectiveness of NGOs relying primarily on information dissemination through mass media and shaming efforts. But this research also shows that human rights groups were not powerless during the Bush years. After 9/11, US-based NGOs continued to lobby successfully on many human rights-related topics, for example on the ICC referral of the Darfur situation. The creation of the off-shore detention facility Guantanamo Bay and the extraordinary efforts to manipulate the definition of torture certainly exposed the weaknesses of law and transnational activism, but those efforts also confirm that the presence and vigilance of human rights groups limits the range of options available to governments.
In the humanitarian sector, the debate about the future of impartiality and neutrality began well before 9/11. The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq added the challenge of a military taking over humanitarian tasks in order to "win the hearts and minds" of those occupied. Unlike the human rights area, there is no clear-cut case for all organizations to shift away traditional, principled behavior, in this case impartial and neutral aid to those suffering. As the presence of aid agencies becomes more permanent, the fiction of being neutral disappears and organizations need to weigh the long-term consequences of their presence. A more permanent transnational presence usually distinguishes the activities sustainable development organizations from humanitarian or human rights groups. Here, the widespread adoption of a rights-based approach is unrelated to 9/11 and represents the most remarkable transformation of a transnational sector.
Yet, the motives for this shift are very similar to other sectors, where organizations have also been primarily driven by an increased awareness of their own limitations and a desire to affect sustainable impact that relies less and less on their presence.
The analysis of transnational human rights activism today can no longer be limited to the activities of organizations such as AI and HRW. The continued diffusion of the human rights discourse has not only contributed to lowering barriers between different types of transnational
NGOs, but has also led to the articulation of profound challenges to traditional practices within various sectors of NGO activism. Human rights may not be the only promising basis for facilitating social and political change, but they are increasingly seen by many as a framework broadly conducive to local empowerment and government accountability. While 9/11 exposed once again the weaknesses of a reactive model of transnational activism, many organizations have begun well before 2001 to reflect on their mandates and strategies and a few have implemented extensive reforms designed to overcome long-standing challenges such as the gap in capacity between Northern and Southern organizations or the lack of strategies designed to address the actual causes of the conditions transnational NGOs have sought to address for decades. It is a whole different issue to evaluate if those changes in transnational organizing and strategy are effectively implemented and actually make the difference suggested by their proponents.
